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Why does an individual
mandate matter?
Our contention that an individual
mandate is critical to achieving
universal coverage rests upon three
points. First, many individuals will not
choose to obtain coverage under a
purely voluntary system. Second,
adverse selection will occur under a
voluntary insurance system.Third, it is
politically difficult to redirect current
government spending on care for the
uninsured to offset the costs associated
with new broad-based reforms unless
the full population is insured.
Evidence on Voluntary Participation.
There is abundant evidence that without
an individual mandate a health reform
would fall well short of achieving
universal coverage.As part of the work
that we did early in the debate over
universal coverage in Massachusetts, we
showed that voluntary approaches
without an employer or individual
mandate would only cover about 40
percent of the uninsured; adding an
employer mandate would still leave
about 50 percent of the uninsured
without coverage.1 We found that
Massachusetts could achieve universal
coverage only with an individual
mandate, even when we assumed
relatively generous subsidies provided to
those with incomes up to 400 percent
of the FPL, government-sponsored
reinsurance for high-cost cases in the
private nongroup and small-group (fewer
than 100 workers) markets, and an
organized purchasing pool.
Other analysts have reached similar
conclusions. In a study that analyzed
health reform options for the state of
New York, the Lewin Group found that
voluntary measures including a public
expansion and subsidized buy-in to a
state health plan reduced the number of
uninsured by 29 percent.Adding an
employer mandate (but not an individual
mandate) to these voluntary measures
reduced the number of uninsured by 36
percent.2 In an analysis extending the
Massachusetts type plan to the United
States, Jon Gruber found that voluntary
measures, including income-related
subsidies and a purchasing arrangement,
would reduce the number of uninsured
by about 50 percent.3
Opponents of an individual mandate
argue that they can come close to
universal coverage with a combination
of income-related subsidies, more
options for purchasing affordable
coverage (e.g., through purchasing
pools), and administrative mechanisms
for facilitating enrollment in insurance.
The most recent data indicate that
there are 47 million uninsured people
in the United States.4 Even if subsidies,
benefits, and administrative
simplifications are sufficient to reach
two-thirds of the uninsured (a reach
beyond what any study to date has
shown for a voluntary system), this
would still leave 15.5 million people
uninsured.This would be admirable, but
would be considerably less than full
coverage, and, as health care costs and
insurance premiums increase, these
numbers could easily erode unless
further government dollars were
injected into the system.
The Implications of Adverse Selection.
Under a voluntary system, the
individuals who are most likely to
enroll in a new subsidized insurance
option or even in a new unsubsidized
option that is open to all individuals
regardless of health status, are those
who are older and who are less healthy
than average.5 People who expect to
use more medical services will value
health insurance coverage more than
those who do not, making them more
likely to participate.And for some
individuals with high medical needs
who do not have access to employer-
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Summary 
How necessary are individual mandates for ensuring that all Americans have
health coverage? 
Many reform proposals being discussed at the state level and in the
presidential campaigns include mandates that individuals must obtain health
insurance.The Massachusetts reforms, for example, include an individual
mandate for adults, conditional on there being an available policy that meets
the affordability standards set by the state. Others would make participation in
insurance programs voluntary, but create new ways to encourage people to
obtain insurance.
In this brief, we delineate the reasons why an individual mandate is essential to
achieving universal coverage. In so doing, we discuss why it is critical that
individual mandate proposals specifically address the affordability of adequate
health insurance coverage and develop fair and effective ways to enforce the
mandate.
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based insurance and who are not
currently eligible for public programs,
such new sources of coverage may be
the only insurance option they have,
given that most states do not have
guaranteed issue of private non-group
insurance.This will also tend to
increase the average health care risk
profile of those voluntarily enrolling in
a new program.
Disproportionate enrollment of higher-
cost individuals will increase expected
average expenditures in the new plan.
Because premiums are traditionally set
based upon the expected health
expenditures of those choosing to
enroll in a particular plan, higher
expected average expenditures will
translate into higher premiums unless
the government intervenes and either
explicitly subsidizes the above-average
costs in the plan or redistributes them
across a broader population through
another mechanism.Absent such
government intervention, higher
premiums would further dissuade
enrollment by younger adults and the
healthy, accelerating the increase in
premiums. Insurance companies are
also likely to be wary of participating in
insurance markets where the likelihood
of adverse selection is high, and low
participation by insurers may dissuade
participation by individuals further due
to limitations on available choices.
Government financing could be used to
offset all or a portion of the high costs
associated with enrolling more
expensive individuals in a new
purchasing pool, but this would raise the
public costs associated with the reform.6
Alternatively, federal regulations of
private insurance markets could be
implemented that forced broader-based
risk pooling across those purchasing
private insurance outside of the new
purchasing pool and those purchasing
inside of the new pool. However, this
would increase premiums for many of
those remaining with their current
source of health insurance coverage,
creating a disincentive for the young and
healthy to purchase insurance coverage
from any private source, potentially
causing further increases in premiums.
Conversely, if all individuals were
required to purchase health insurance,
policies could be put in place that
spread the excess costs associated with
high medical needs across the entire
population. Because most individuals
are healthy, each person’s share of these
costs would be modest.Additionally,
there would be no concerns that doing
so would lead to declines in insurance
coverage among the healthy or that
average premiums would escalate as the
insured population declined over time.
Voluntary measures alone provide no
such protections and may lead to
continued increases in financial
burdens being placed upon those with
the greatest health care needs.
The primary impact of a mandate will
be to increase the financing burdens of
younger and healthier individuals.All
will find their access to health
insurance and necessary medical care
more stable and secure, however.This
approach will tend to provide benefits
for all individuals over time as they age
or otherwise find themselves with
substantial medical needs. In addition,
young people with modest incomes can
be protected from significant adverse
financial consequences of this broader
risk-sharing approach via income-
related subsidies.
Sources of Financing for Health
Reforms. Another reason for favoring an
individual mandate is that it would free
up current public spending that could
then be used to finance expensive
health care reforms.The financing for
universal coverage could include funds
that currently support safety net
hospitals and others that provide care
to the uninsured. However, voluntary
measures will also be costly because,
while fewer of the uninsured will be
covered, those who will voluntarily
participate and who will take advantage
of new subsidized programs tend to be
older and less healthy than average.
Thus, the cost of a major voluntary
expansion with generous subsidies
would not be substantially lower than a
plan that provides universal coverage.7
At the same time, without universal
coverage, a voluntary reform effort will
have a much more limited ability to
make use of the large amount of funds
currently flowing from Medicare,
Medicaid and other public programs to
safety net providers. Safety net hospitals
and clinics and other providers of care
to the poor would make strong political
claims that they cannot afford to give
up their direct subsidies when such a
large number of people would remain
uncovered and thus be potential users
of charity care.
The incremental cost of bringing in the
additional people that would be enrolled
through an individual mandate would be
relatively low because these reluctant
enrollees would tend to be younger and
healthier than the voluntary enrollees.
But the new program’s political claim on
existing safety net dollars that support
the currently uninsured would be




As we argued above, an individual
mandate to have health insurance
coverage is necessary for achieving
universal coverage and has important
implications for average premiums and
the financing of reforms.There are,
however, two issues with an individual
mandate that require further discussion.
Initial negative reactions to an
individual mandate often hinge on the
notion that individuals would be
required to purchase insurance
coverage that they cannot afford, and
that failing to do so, draconian
enforcement mechanisms and penalties
would be imposed. Here we address
these two related concerns of
affordability and enforcement.
Affordability. No individual mandate
would be morally or politically
acceptable if required premiums
exceed an individual or family’s ability
to pay. Defining what is affordable for
families of different economic
circumstances is inherently a value
judgment, however, and as of now, there
is no established social consensus on
what that should be. None of the
candidates has yet to delineate their
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perspectives on this issue. In our work,
we have demonstrated the importance
of taking both premiums and out-of-
pocket liability into account when
assessing affordability of health
insurance.8 For example, a health
insurance plan may have a low
premium and seem affordable to a
person of modest income; however, if
the low premium reflects a deductible
of thousands of dollars and limited
covered benefits, it would not provide
affordable access to medical care for
that individual when they needed it.
After considerable deliberation,
Massachusetts adopted a health
insurance affordability schedule that
seems quite reasonable, particularly
given the generosity of the benefit
packages offered through their Medicaid,
SCHIP, and Commonwealth Care
programs to the population with
incomes below 300 percent of the FPL.
Children with incomes below 300
percent of the FPL can obtain
comprehensive coverage at no or little
cost through the state’s Medicaid and
SCHIP programs (MassHealth).
Commonwealth Care is available to
adults in the same income group who
have not had access to employer-
sponsored insurance in the preceding 6
months.Those below 150 percent of the
FPL are not required to pay any
premium; those below 100 percent of
the FPL would face virtually no cost-
sharing requirements, and those
between 100 and 150 percent of the FPL
would face very modest co-payments.
Covered benefits are comprehensive and
no Commonwealth Care plan includes
deductibles. Premiums are charged for
enrollees between 150 and 300 percent
of FPL, with premiums and co-payments
somewhat higher for those between 200
and 300 percent of the FPL.Those at 250
to 300 percent of the FPL would face
premiums of 4 to 5 percent of income.9
We have shown elsewhere that,
nationally, those with incomes between
200 and 300 percent of the FPL who
buy their insurance through the private
non-group market already spend an
average of 12 to 14 percent of their
incomes on premiums, or 17 to 21
percent of income when also taking into
account out-of-pocket medical costs.10
Reflecting these high financial burdens
and lack of guaranteed issue of these
policies, only a small percentage of
people in this income range without
access to other sources of insurance
actually purchase coverage in the non-
group market.Thus, the subsidy schedule
that has been adopted in Massachusetts
provides a broadly accessible insurance
plan at considerably lower financial
burden than is found in the nongroup
market in Massachusetts as well as in the
United States today. Moreover, the
Massachusetts experience shows that an
individual mandate with a generous
definition of affordability and
corresponding subsidy schedule can
actually be quite progressive; that is, low-
income individuals spend less as a
percentage of income than higher-
income individuals.
Enforcement. Enforcement is necessary
in order to achieve universal coverage
under an individual mandate, but it is
also important as a matter of fairness to
the overwhelming majority of those who
already have coverage or who voluntarily
comply.The first and most important
step to enforcing an individual mandate
is to make it easy for people to comply
with it and to enroll in qualifying
insurance coverage. Substantial amounts
need to be spent on outreach and
education. Many avenues through which
people can obtain coverage will be
necessary. For example, employers could
be required to facilitate the enrollment
of their workers even if they do not
contribute to that coverage.11 Public
schools can provide assistance in
enrolling families, and health care
providers can provide assistance in
enrolling those seeking medical care.
Ultimately, penalties are needed to
ensure compliance. However, our
preferred approach is that the state
deem all residents to be covered and
that the tax penalty serve as a way of
collecting unpaid premiums. Initially,
penalties should be modest as the
system is put in place, initial
implementation difficulties are resolved,
and educational and outreach efforts
take effect. Later, those not complying
with the mandate could be required to
pay the premium that they would have
paid had they enrolled in coverage. Low-
income individuals who would have
been eligible for fully subsidized
premiums would therefore incur no
penalty, and those who would have been
eligible for partially subsidized coverage
would have only modest penalties.
Penalties could be assessed when
people pay taxes. Insurers could be
required to provide information on the
insurance that people had and the dates
they were covered during the year, in
the same way that mortgage companies
now provide information on interest
payments. Failure to provide evidence
of coverage would result in the
imposition of a tax penalty.
Massachusetts chose to make the
penalty (in the second year after
implementation) half of the cost of the
premium, on the theory that individuals
would find this an onerous burden
given that they would not be provided
with health insurance.
Discussion
We conclude that, absent a single payer
system, it is not possible to achieve
universal coverage without an individual
mandate.The evidence is strong that
voluntary measures themselves would
leave the nation with large numbers of
people still uninsured. Moreover,
voluntary measures would tend to enroll
disproportionate numbers of individuals
with higher-cost health problems,
creating high premiums and instability in
the health insurance pools in which they
are enrolled, unless further significant
government subsidization is provided.
Leaving a large number of uninsured
would also mean that the government
would have difficulty laying claim to the
substantial amounts of current public
health care funding that could be used
under a mandate to offset some of the
cost associated with a new program.
Covering the remaining uninsured
through a mandate would add healthier,
lower-cost people and under a reform
and allow the government to lay claim to
the funds already in the system.
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